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In the past, the methodology of terrorist groups active in Europe, such as ETA and the Provisional IRA (PIRA), has been characterised as ‘a lot of people watching, not many dead’;1 in other words, attacks were designed to draw atten tion to a particular cause and to pressurise governments into negotiation, but not to inflict large numbers of casualties for their own sake. Al-Qaeda, on the other hand, has focused from the outset on mass-casualty attacks and on targets of economic significance. Its approach resembles conventional warfare, with the effect being enhanced by the widespread use of suicide bombers. Moreover, in contrast to groups such as PIRA, it is not clear what kind of political accommodation could realistically be reached with al-Qaeda, even assuming that European governments might be prepared to contem plate such an option. Europe has also experienced a degree of international terrorism, from groups such as the Palestinian Black September and others linked to the Iranian, Libyan and Syrian states having undertaken a variety of attacks in France, Germany, Greece and the U